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FIXING THE DELTA: 
THE CALFED BAY-DELTA 
PROGRAM AND WATER POLICY 
UNDER THE DAVIS 
ADMINISTRATION 
By PATRICK WRIGHT* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 9, 2000, California Governor Gray Davis and 
U.S. Department of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt led a 
large consortium of state and federal agencies in adopting the 
most comprehensive water management program in the na-
tion - the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.1 The plan (Frame-
work for Action and subsequent Record of Decision2) was the 
product of over five years of discussions and negotiations 
among the state and federal agencies and urban, agricultural, 
and environmental interests over how to allocate California's 
water supplies among many competing uses.3 
The Framework for Action was greeted with cautious op-
timism and some skepticism among the major interest groups, 
and newspaper editorials generally praised the effort. 4 Few 
* Patrick Wright is the Director of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, and also 
serves as Deputy Secretary of the California Resources Agency. He was previously a 
senior policy advisor to the Regional Administrator of U.S. EPA, and to the Deputy 
Secretary of Interior, where he coordinated federal agency participation in the Bay-
Delta Program. 
1 See California's Water Future, A Framework for Action, CALFED Bay-Delta 
Program (2000). 
2 See PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION, CALFED BAy-DELTA PROGRAM (2000). 
3 See id. at 1. 
4 See Matthew Barrows, Historic Water Plan Unveiled: Precarious Balance Be· 
331 
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observers were convinced that the plan would end the state's 
water wars, but many were relieved that a comprehensive 
plan was finally in place.5 
For the previous two decades, water planning and politics 
have been characterized by conflict rather than cooperation. 
Each of the major interest groups have been powerful enough 
to block each other, in court or at the ballot box, but none 
have been powerful enough to enact their own agenda. Envi-
ronmental groups, for example, have been successful in block-
ing new reservoirs, but unable to stop increased diversions 
from the Delta that have contributed to listings of several fish 
species under the federal Endangered Species Act. With the 
exception of passage of the federal Central Valley Project Im-
provement Act (CVPIA) in the waning hours of the Bush Ad-
ministration, the resulting stalemate has prevented progress 
in either restoring the San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary or im-
proving the state's water supply reliability.6 
The CALFED Bay-Delta Program, and the 1994 Bay-
Delta Accord that preceded it, began with the hope of break-
ing this gridlock. 7 They also reflect anew, more collaborative 
way of setting water policy that holds the promise of produc-
ing more lasting solutions. The state and federal agencies and 
stakeholders are now working together to implement a $8.6 
billion program to address the state's most pressing ecosystem 
restoration, water quality, and water supply reliability needs. 
The Framework for Action and Record of Decision were 
developed over a five year period through two different state 
administrations and several changes in leadership in the 
Clinton Administration. Many of the key milestones and pri-
orities for implementation, however, were negotiated in a fi-
nal series of negotiations between the state and federal agen-
tween Aiding Delta and Meeting Demands, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 10, 2000 at PAGE; 
Nancy Vogel, Pact Averts New Hostilities in Water Wars, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 12, 
2000 at PAGE; Glen Martin, State Water Plan Taps into Art of Compromise. San 
Francisco Chronicle, June 10, 2000, Editorial, Water: Pushing into the Future, Los 
ANGELES TIMES, June 12, 2000; Editorial, A Good Water Plan, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, 
June 12, 2000; Editorial, CALFED Takes Big Step, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 18, 
2000. 
5 See id. 
S See Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 
(1992). 
7 See supra note 1. 
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cies in the spring of 2000. Through these negotiations, the 
administration of California Governor Gray Davis put its own 
stamp on the Record of Decision, and set the course for state 
water policy for the next decade. 
This article will examine the origins and key elements of 
the CALFED Record of Decision, the role of the Davis Admin-
istration in developing the final plan, and the major chal-
lenges ahead in implementing the plan.8 
II. THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY-DELTA: .AN OVERVIEW 
San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
River Delta combine to form the largest estuary on the West 
Coast.9 The estuary's watershed drains 40% of the state, in-
cluding the watersheds of the Sacramento and San Joaquin 
Rivers, which flow from the Sierra Nevada and Coast Range 
through the Central Valley and Delta to San Francisco Bay.lO 
Historically, the Delta and much of the Central Valley 
was a vast region of wetlands, before pioneer settlers diked 
the islands and reclaimed the soil for farmland. ll Today the 
Delta's 700-square mile maze of islands and channels serves 
as the hub of the state's two largest water distribution sys-
tems, the federal Central Valley Project and the State Water 
Project. The state and federal projects export water through 
canals and aqueducts to the San Francisco Bay Area, San 
Joaquin Valley and southern California, providing water to 
over 4.5 million acres of irrigated farmland, and to over 20 
million residents. Two-thirds of the state's residents receive 
some or all of their drinking water supplies from the Delta.12 
The Bay-Delta estuary also supports the state's largest 
habitat for fish and wildlife, providing a migration corridor for 
two-thirds of state's salmon, and nearly half of the waterfowl 
and shorebirds along the Pacific Flyway. The estuary supports 
over 120 fish species, and contains Suisun Marsh, the largest 
contiguous brackish water marsh in the United States.13 
8 Much of the discussion in this article is based on the author's experience as a 
participant in his capacity as a senior state or federal official. 
9 See SAN FRANCISCO ESTUARY PROJECT, SACRAMENTO - SAN JOAQUIN DELTA (1992). 
10 See id. 
11 See WATER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, LAYPERSON'S GUIDE TO THE DELTA (2000). 
12 See id. 
13 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San 
3
Wright: San Francisco Bay-Delta
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
334 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
The fish and wildlife resources of the Bay and Delta have 
undergone significant declines over the past several decades. 
Prolonged drought, diversions of freshwater, and dramatic in-
creases in introduced species have reduced fish species, in-
cluding salmon, steelhead, striped bass, and Delta smelt, to 
extremely low levels. 14 
Despite these declines, large demands for water by the 
agricultural community and the state's growing urban areas 
have made it difficult to allocate additional freshwater flows 
for environmental purposes. Given the competing interests for 
available supplies, managing the state's water resources is a 
delicate balancing act. 
III. THE 1994 BAY-DELTA ACCORD AND THE ORIGINS OF 
CALFED 
The predecessor to the CALFED Bay Delta Program was 
the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord, which grew out of several years of 
conflict surrounding the adequacy of freshwater flows to pro-
tect the ecological health of the estuary.15 
The State Water Resources Control Board ("State Board") 
grappled with Delta outflows in its 1978 Water Quality Con-
trol Plan.16 No sooner had the Board made its decision than 
the lawsuits began, lawsuits that ultimately yielded a court 
order asking the Board to revisit its decisionY The Board 
made one attempted revision in 1988, but this proposal was 
withdrawn after public outcry. IS A second, more limited revi-
sion to the water quality control plan followed in 1991, but 
this revision failed to deal with the crucial issue of Delta 
Joaquin River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 4664 (1995). 
14 See SAN FRANCISCO ESTUARY PROJECT, SAN FRANCISCO BAY-DELTA ESTUARY (Feb-
ruary 1991). 
15 See PRINCIPLES FOR AGREEMENT ON BAy-DELTA STANDARDS BETWEEN THE STATE 
OF CALIFORNlA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1994). 
16 See California State Water Resources Control Board, Water Right Decision 
1485, Water Quality Control Plan for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun 
Marsh, adopted August 1978. 
17 See United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal.App.3d 82 
(1986). 
18 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San 
Joaquin River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 811 (1994) 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss4/2
2001] SAN FRANCISCO BAY-DELTA 335 
outflow. 19 
While the State Board continued its painful process of 
Plan amendments, Federal· statutes began to come into play. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") listed the 
winter-run chinook salmon as threatened under the Federal 
Endangered Species Act in November 1990, and imposed sev-
eral restrictions on water project operations.20 Environmental 
groups began petitioning the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
("FWS") for additional listings.21 The Federal Clean Water Act 
also came into play when the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") formally disapproved the State's water quality 
standards in the Delta in 1991.22 Finally, Congress leapt into 
the fray with the passage of the CVPIA in October 1992.23 
All of this activity threatened to explode in 1993, when 
the State administration withdrew yet another draft water 
quality plan,24 the FWSproposed listing the Delta Smelt 
under the ESA,25 and U.S. EPA proposed Federal water qual-
ity standards for the Bay and Delta. 26 Fortunately, leaders 
19 See CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER RIGHT ORDER 
91-15: WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR SALINITY FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO/SACRA-
MENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY (1991). 
20 See Endangered and Threatened Species; Sacramento River Winter-run Chi-
nook Salmon, 50 C.F.R. § 27; NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPIN-
ION FOR THE OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CENTRAL V ALLEY PROJECT AND THE CALIFORNIA 
STATE WATER PROJECT (1993). 
21 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlike and 
Plants; Notice of 90-day Findings on Petition to List the Delta Smelt and Delhi Sands 
Flower-Loving Fly as Endangered, 55 Fed. Reg. 52852 (1990); U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding On and 
Commencement of Status Review for a Petition to List the Sacramento Splittail and 
Longtin Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg. 36184 (1993) 
22 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San 
Joaquin River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 810 (1994). 
23 See Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3401 et seq., 106 Stat.4600, 4706 (1992). 
24 See CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, DRAFT WATER RIGHT 
DECISION 1630: SAN FRANCIScoiSACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY (1992). See 
also Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, to John Caffrey, 
Acting Chair of the California State Water Resources Control Board, reprinted in 3 
Cal.Water L. & Pol'y Rptr. 153 (1993). 
25 See United States and Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 
Fed.Reg. 23854 (1993). 
26 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River San 
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emerged from the government and stakeholder communities, 
and these leaders took advantage of the conflicts to forge a 
new collaboration. 
First, under the leadership of DOl Assistant Secretary 
Betsy Rieke, the Federal government agencies (EPA, FWS, 
NMFS, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ("USBR") formed 
"Club FED" to coordinate Federal efforts in the Bay and 
Delta.27 Until then, each federal agency acted independently 
in exercising their respective authorities under the Clean 
Water Act and Endangered Species Act. While EPA was con~ 
tinuing to push the State to adopt water quality standards 
that would be approvable under the Clean Water Act, FWS 
and NMFS were separately and independently issuing regula~ 
tions under the Endangered Species Act. The first major ac~ 
complishment of this group was to issue an integrated set of 
regulatory proposals published together in a single federal 
register notice in January 1994.28 
This coordinated effort, together with the state's earlier 
establishment of the Governor's Water Policy Council, ulti~ 
mately led to the development of a joint approach. Under the 
Framework Agreement signed in June 1994,29 the State and 
Federal agencies agreed to 1) work together in developing new 
state standards that would satisfy federal Clean Water Act 
and Endangered Species Act requirements; 2) coordinate the 
operations of the state and federal water projects; and 3) de~ 
velop a long~term planning process that later became the 
Joaquin River, and San Francisco By and Delta of the State of California 59 Fed. 
Reg. 810 (1994). 
27 See UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, UNITED STATE BUREAU OF REC· 
LAMATION, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PRo· 
TECTION AGENCY, AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION ON CALIFORNIA BAy/DELTA ISSUES 
(1993). 
28 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River San 
Joaquin River, and San Francisco By and Delta of the State of California, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 810 (1994). 
29 See FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR'S WATER POLICY COUNCIL 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDERAL ECOSYSTEM DIRECTORATE (1994). The 
early Club Fed efforts, the Framework Agreement, and the Bay-Delta Accord were all 
focused primarily on integrating CWA and ESA requirements. As discussed later, 
their failure to also address and integrate CVPIA water allocation requirements 
threatened to unravel support for the Accord and became a major focus of the final 
CALFED Bay-Delta Program negotiations. 
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CALFED Bay-Delta Program.30 
To meet the first goal, the State and Federal agencies 
joined ongoing stakeholder efforts to define at least a tempo-
rary solution to the Delta issues. On December 15, 1994, Gov-
ernor Wilson and Secretary Babbitt signed the Bay-Delta Ac-
cord, together with a large group of stakeholders who 
participated in negotiating the final agreement.31 The Accord 
was developed through two years of discussions among the 
agencies and urban, agricultural, and environmental inter-
ests, and a final round of intense negotiations that concluded 
just hours before a court-ordered deadline for EPA to set fed-
eral standards.32 The Accord's key provisions called for signifi-
cant increases in freshwater flows to the Bay, in return for 
greater water supply reliability and the promise of a long-
term planning process.33 
The Accord paved the way for the CALFED Program in 
two important respects: It solidified the high level of agency 
coordination in decision making and it highlighted the need 
for stakeholder participation in resolving these complex 
disputes.34 
The Accord was billed as a temporary truce in the state's 
water allocation wars until a more comprehensive solution 
could be developed as part of the CALFED Program. The 
truce was short lived, however, as the agencies and stakehold-
ers who signed the Accord began to have different interpreta-
tions of its key provisions.35 These disagreements erupted into 
30 See id. at 4-5. 
31 See Bay-Delta Accord supra note 12 
32 See Bruce Babbitt, Restoring our Natural Heritage, NATURAL RESOURCES & EN-
VIRONMENT 147-148 (Winter 2000). 
33 See id. 
34 See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sus-
tainability, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev341 (1996); Patrick Wright, The Federal Perspective on 
the Bay-Delta Standards, CAL. WATER L. & POL'y RPTR (1995). These articles provide 
a more thorough discussion of the events and lessons learned in the Bay-Delta Ac-
cord negotiations. 
35 The disagreements were focused primarily on the level of water supply "assur-
ances" provided in the agreement. For example, many in the agricultural community 
have argued that the Accord established a cap on further reductions in water sup-
plies, and provided protections from additional restrictions to protect endangered fish 
entrained at the pumping plants, and from allocations of water for fish under the 
CVPIA. Others, including the federal agencies, have argued that the Accord protec-
tions were limited to habitat needs, and did not extend to pumping restrictions neces-
7
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frequent, highly visible conflicts over water project operations 
every year, and generated a great deal of mistrust among the 
agencies and stakeholders - at the same time that their par-
ticipation was needed in developing a long term plan as part 
of the CALFED program. 
IV. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE CALFED BAY DELTA PROGRAM 
UNDER THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION 
The CALFED Bay Delta Program began in 1995 as a co-
operative effort to fix the Delta - the heart of the state's 
water distribution system.36 In the early years, the workshops 
and public meetings Program focused primarily on potential 
changes to the state's storage and conveyance systems -
changes that would allow more reliable water supplies to be 
shipped through the Delta from northern to southern Califor-
nia while improving the biological health of the estuary. But 
as the planning process stretched out over several years and 
more interests became involved, the program evolved into a 
comprehensive plan with eight major program elements: stor-
age, conveyance, ecosystem restoration, water quality, levee 
restoration, watersheds, water use efficiency, and water 
transfers. 37 
The CALFED Bay Delta Program released a draft 
programmatic EISIEIR in March 1998.38 This draft did not in-
clude a preferred alternative, and was in effect a mechanism 
for securing more formal comment from the interested stake-
holders. Comments were generated at more than a dozen pub-
sary to reduce "take" at the state and federal pumping plants, or to restrictions nec-
essary to implement the CVPIA. 
36 See Notice of Intent to Prepare Environmental Impact StatementlEnvironmen-
tal Impact Report, 61 Fed.Reg. 10379 (1996). 
37 The storage and conveyance elements received more attention at this stage, in 
part, because they were described as "variable" elements in the alternatives, while 
the other elements were described as "common" elements that did not vary among 
the alternatives evaluated. 
38 See Notice of Availability of Draft Environmental Impact StatementlEnviron-
mental Impact Report, 63 Fed.Reg. 12823 (1998); See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§21000 et ceq.(West 1996). A joint EISIEIR allows the federal and state agencies to 
fulfill their respective obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 
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lic hearings throughout the state, as well as in more than 
1800 written comments submitted to the Program. 
As the Wilson Administration drew towards an end, Sec-
retary Babbitt and George Dunn, Chief of Staff to Governor 
Wilson, initiated a monumental effort to reach a consensus 
among the various stakeholder representatives on an appro-
priate preferred alternative for the CALFED Bay Delta Pro-
gram. During the summer and fall of 1998, these leaders 
sponsored weekly meetings of stakeholders, considered the en-
tire range of issues in the Program, and sought agreement. 
The time commitment made at this high level of state and 
federal governments was unprecedented, and underscores the 
importance of California water issues on both the state and 
national levels. 
Although the Babbitt/Dunn discussions helped define 
most of the contours of a CALFED solution, ultimate success -
defined at the time as formal stakeholder consensus - eluded 
them. Several divisive issues, including the role of new reser-
voirs and water conveyance structures, prevented a final 
agreement. Instead, the CALFED agencies issued a "Phase II 
Report" summarizing the progress made by the end the Wil-
son Administration.39 
In retrospect, the BabbittlDunn discussions may have 
pushed too hard to develop a stakeholder consensus, rather 
than to issue a final plan based on stakeholder comments and 
recommendations. By including the stakeholders in the draft-
ing sessions, the agencies were forced to weaken or qualify 
many of the key recommendations as they sought to gain 
unanimous support. Given the complexity of the program and 
the competing interests, it was probably unrealistic to expect 
formal agreement among all of the stakeholder groups. 
v. CALFED UNDER THE DAVIS ADMINISTRATION 
At the outset of the Davis Administration, it was not at 
all clear where the Governor would stand on water issues. 
Historically, water issues are politically treacherous, and the 
new Administration was wary. While the Governor generally 
supported the CALFED Program as a candidate, water issues 
were not prominent in the campaign. Immediately upon tak-
39 See CALFED BAy-DELTA PROGRAM, REVISED PHAsE II REPORT (1998). 
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ing office, the Governor generally maintained his support for 
the program, and urged the agencies and stakeholder groups 
to find common ground. He also insisted upon a balanced plan 
that would address the key short and long-term needs of each 
of the major stakeholder groups. 
This approach was a major disappointment for many en-
vironmental groups, who had hoped that a new Democratic 
administration, together with the Clinton Administration and 
Democratic majorities in the state assembly and senate, 
would significantly change the direction of the Program. In-
stead, the Davis administration's moderate, incremental ap-
proach, which has become the hallmark of his first two years, 
helped cement the framework of the Program negotiated with 
the previous administration. 
As the Davis Administration took office in January of 
1999, the basic elements of the CALFED plan were in place. 
The Program released a second, revised draft EISIEIR in June 
of 1999 with a framework for each of the major program ele-
ments.40 For the first time, the Program also selected a pre-
ferred alternative, which was centered around making signifi-
cant improvements in the existing plumbing system to meet 
the Program's ecosystem restoration, water supply reliability, 
and water quality goals. 
Despite these signs of progress, however, the level of 
stakeholder support for the program was eroding, for several 
reasons. 
First, stakeholders whose vision for the program was re-
jected became disillusioned. These included proponents of the 
peripheral canal41 and/or major new onstream surface storage 
projects on the one side, and opponents of any increased di-
versions and storage projects on the other. Farm groups began 
to step up their concerns about the impacts of the ecosystem 
40 The peripheral canal is a proposed 42 mile water conveyance structure that 
would circumvent the maze of Delta channels and directly carry Sacramento River 
water south to the state and federal pumping plants. The canal was defeated in a 
state referendum in 1982 because of cost and environmental concerns, but later re-
surfaced as an alternative in the CALFED Program. 
41 The peripheral canal is a proposed 42 mile water conveyance structure that 
would circumvent the maze of Delta channels and directly carry Sacramento River 
water south to the state and federal pumping plants. The canal was defeated in a 
state referendum in 1982 because of cost and environmental concerns, but later re-
surfaced as an alternative in the CALFED Program. 
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program on agricultural lands, and Delta agricultural inter-
ests grew worried that their water supply and quality would 
be put at risk as pumping from the Delta increased. 
Second, the ongoing disagreements over water project op-
erations and interpretations of the Accord and CVPIA rules 
became a lightning rod for opponents of the Program. In the 
late summer of 1999, the Fish and Wildlife Service shut down 
Delta pumping for an extended period as large numbers of 
Delta smelt, a listed species, were being killed at the state 
and federal pumping plants. Environmental groups charged 
that the agencies weren't doing enough to protect the species, 
and water users claimed that the promise of certainty in the 
Bay-Delta Accord was being abandoned. Another conflict 
erupted in November of 1999, when a series of decisions to re-
operate the state and federal water projects to protect fisher-
ies and water supply began to severely degrade water quality 
levels in the Delta. 
To the agencies, these episodes only underscored the im-
portance of developing a new set of water management tools 
through the CALFED Program to better manage the ongoing 
conflicts. But to many of the stakeholders, the episodes con-
tributed to a lack of confidence in the agencies developing the 
program. As the disagreements intensified, they eroded much 
of any remaining trust that might have existed among the 
stakeholders who negotiated the Accord, and just as impor-
tant, diverted their time and attention from working col-
laboratively in developing the CALFED Plan. 
Finally, many stakeholders simply became tired and frus-
trated with the process and its seemingly endless meetings. In 
the face of what some began calling "CALFED fatigue", the 
early promise of a stakeholder-driven process gave way to a 
demand for the agencies to provide more leadership and make 
decisions. 
VI. THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE FRAMEWORK AND 
RECORD OF DECISION 
To regain momentum behind the program, the state and 
federal agencies began meeting early in 2000 to discuss their 
options in finalizing the plan. They quickly agreed to hold a 
series of meetings over the following months to develop and 
issue the final plan. With the presidential elections approach-
11
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ing in November, it was clear that a final plan had to be is-
sued by summer or risk starting over with a new federal 
administration. 
As the final negotiations began, the active involvement of 
the Governor's office and state cabinet officials was essential. 
The state team was led by cabinet secretary Susan Kennedy, 
and included Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, Department 
of Fish and Game Director Robert Hight, California Environ-
mental Protection Agency Secretary Winston Hickox, Depart-
ment of Water Resources Director Tom Hannigan and his 
Chief Deputy Steve Macaulay, Congressman Gary Condit, 
Keith Brackpool, an advisor to the Governor, and various 
other staff. 42 
The new state team was an extremely diverse group, and 
well reflected the interests and divisions within the stake-
holder groups. Despite these differences, the new state team 
worked hard to reconcile their competing viewpoints and forge 
a state consensus. 
The Federal side of the discussions was led once again by 
Secretary Babbitt and by his long time aide and new Deputy 
Secretary David Hayes. Other federal leaders, including Feli-
cia Marcus, the Regional Administrator of U.S. EPA, were 
brought into the discussions as issues moved beyond the 
CVPIA and Endangered Species Act. 
Given the substantial progress of the Program in develop-
ing the broad framework for a CALFED plan, the final discus-
sions focused on the most difficult unresolved issues. The 
state team focused its attention on a few key issues. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT 
A key element of the final plan was the establishment of 
an Environmental Water Account (EWA).43 The basic idea was 
that a large block of water would be purchased to supplement 
existing regulatory protections for the fisheries, and to protect 
Delta exporters from further pumping restrictions to minimize 
42 The author participated in these discussions in my capacity as Deputy Secre-
tary for Resources. AB noted earlier, my conclusions are largely based on my partici-
pation in these and other meetings. 
43 See Programmatic Record of Decision, supra note 2, § 2.2.7; See also id. at At-
tachment 2, Environmental Water Account Operating Principles Agreement. 
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entrainment of threatened and endangered fish species at the 
state and federal pumping plants. The EWA was essential to 
provide regulatory assurances under the federal Endangered 
Species Act that no additional water would be needed to pro-
tect listed species. Through this innovative approach, the 
agencies hoped to provide both the additional freshwater 
flows necessary to protect the Delta fisheries and the regula-
tory stability necessary to gain support from the agricultural 
and urban water users. 
But for EWA to succeed, the agencies had to agree on the 
regulatory protections, or "baseline," upon which it was built. 
The Department of Interior had been struggling since the pas-
sage of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act in 1992 to 
develop guidelines for allocating 800,000 acre feet of water 
provided for environmental purposes under the Act. Mter a 
legal challenge to its initial allocation policy, DOl issued a 
new, more aggressive policy that drew strong opposition from 
the water users and many within the state administration.44 
At first, Secretary Babbitt and his staff balked at making 
any changes in its CVPIA implementation strategy as part of 
the CALFED plan, particularly after it survived a legal chal-
lenge in the summer of 1999. But when the Davis administra-
tion made it clear that some changes would be necessary to 
clear the way for progress on the long-term issues as part of 
CALFED, the federal agencies agreed to put them back on the 
table for discussion. Ultimately, DOl agreed to some modest 
reductions in water allocated to fish under its CVPIA imple-
mentation plan that were offset by increased purchases of 
water for fish as part of the new Environmental Water Ac-
count (EWA). 
More than any element of the CALFED plan, the State's 
insistence on these changes had a profound 'and lasting im-
pact on stakeholder perceptions of the administration. Many 
in the water user community, who were initially skeptical of 
the Davis Administration, became convinced that the state 
team was willing to stand up to the federal government to de-
fend their interests. Some environmental groups, frustrated 
with their lack of direct access to the Governor, became fur-
44 See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. United States, Nos. CV-F~ 
97-6140, CV-F-98-5261 m.D. Cal., filed Mar. 13, 2000). 
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ther disillusioned. Other, more pragmatic environmental 
groups were more willing to accept compromises to achieve 
their long term goals of securing more water and money for 
ecosystem restoration. 
B. SETI'ING MILESTONES 
The Davis administration also put its stamp on the final 
plan by firmly insisting on specific milestones and deadlines 
for every major element of the program. Acutely aware of the 
disagreements and lack of clarity that arose over the Accord, 
they were determined to make the plan as clear and unambig-
uous as possible, and insisted upon setting specific dates and 
milestones for each key element of the plan.45 The plan also 
requires an annual report to ensure that all program ele-
ments move forward together.46 
Again, this approach divided the interest groups. The 
water users were generally supportive, but were concerned 
that process commitments to build new projects were not 
strong enough. The environmental community, on the other 
hand, was concerned that the commitments were premature 
and inappropriate without much more site-specific analyses. 
The CALFED Plan generally struck a middle ground, through 
a strong commitment to immediately move forward with envi-
ronmental and technical review of the most promising 
projects.47 
C. STORAGE 
The Governor's moderate, incremental approach was also 
reflected in the CALFED Program's decisions on surface stor-
age reservoirs, one of the most contentious elements of the 
plan. The urban and agricultural communities urged the Pro-
gram to make strong commitments to build new off-stream 
reservoirs to meet the state's growing demand for water. The 
environmental community, however, strongly opposed moving 
45 See Record of Decision, supra note 2, at pp. 42-47. For example, where the pre-
vious draft plan suggested that the Program "may" include new storage projects if 
certain conditions were met, the final plan included a series of specific dates and 
commitments for each step in the process, from planning to approval for construction. 
46 See id. at 4-5. 
47 See id. at 42-47. 
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forward on these projects until other, less environmentally 
damaging alternatives were exhausted, including aggressive 
water conservation and recycling programs. In the final plan, 
the CALFED agencies agreed to move forward on the studies 
needed to build the most promising projects, and to make a fi-
nal decision on whether and how to proceed after a thorough 
review and opportunity for public comment. They also agreed 
to invest heavily in local groundwater management and water 
use efficiency programs throughout the state. Through this 
approach, the Program was able to demonstrate its commit-
ment to providing more reliable supplies through a broad set 
of programs, while stressing that specific projects must un-
dergo detailed site-specific environmental analyses to gain 
approval. 
D. FUNDING COMMITMENTS 
Finally, to further solidify support for the plan, the Davis 
Administration made commitments to unprecedented invest-
ments in the plan. The final plan includes a budget calling for 
investments of $8.6 billion over a seven year period.48 Fortu-
nately, the passage of Propositions 20449 and 1350, together 
with a large surplus in the general fund, made available sub-
stantial resources to draw upon in the early years of 
implementation. 
VII. REACTIONS TO THE PLAN 
On balance, the stakeholder and press reaction to the Re-
cord of Decision has been favorable, although measured. 
Many groups welcomed the specific commitments in the plan, 
and a fresh start after years of gridlock, but expressed skepti-
cism as to whether the agencies could deliver on the ambi-
tious timetable. Given the history of conflict over water is-
sues, the measured reaction was not entirely unexpected. 
Many stakeholders expressed concern that, unlike the 
earlier BabbittlDunn discussions, the agencies did not include 
them in the final series of negotiations on setting the priori-
48 See Framework for Action, supra note 1, at App. A. 
49 See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 78500 et seq. (West Supp. 2001). 
50 See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79000 et. seq. (West Supp. 2001). 
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ties for implementation. This approach cost the agencies some 
support, particularly from members of Congress and the state 
legislature, but produced a much stronger document, free of 
the many qualifiers and contingencies that plagued the ear-
lier draft programmatic documents. Ironically, many of the 
same stakeholders who had previously demanded leadership 
from the agencies in making the tough decisions after seem-
ingly endless stakeholder discussions now criticized the agen-
cies for taking this approach. 
The agencies recognized that most stakeholders would ex-
press support for many key elements of the plan, but also 
have concerns with others. The hope was that the plan as a 
whole would attract broad-based support and form the basis 
of continued cooperation among the agencies· and 
stakeholders. 51 
The lawsuits filed in response to the Record of Decision 
were also not unexpected. Three different lawsuits, on behalf 
of the California Farm Bureau, the Municipal Water District 
of Orange County, and an interesting coalition of Delta 
diverters and rural counties have been filed in various state 
and federal courts.52 Substantively, these lawsuits raise par-
ticular concerns about how the Record of Decision will be im-
plemented or concerns that the Record of Decision inade-
quately addressed their specific issues.53 In addition, these 
lawsuits are symptomatic of the historic distrust between 
water-rich areas of the State and other areas reliant on dis-
tant water sources. They also reflect the historic mistrust of 
the state and federal agencies among local governments. 
51 In general, stakeholder groups who have the staff and resources to fully par-
ticipate have been more comfortable working with the agencies - and have more real-
istic expectations - while local interests who have a more d~fficult time being heard 
have been less supportive of the program. Hopefully, this perception will change as 
program moves to a more regionally and locally-based focus in the implementation 
stage. 
52 See Don Laub v. Babbitt, CV F-OO-6601 OWW SMS (E.D. Cal. FULL DATE); 
Municipal Water District of Orange Co. v. California Resources Agency, No. 
BC237574 (Los Angeles County Superior Court); Regional Council of Rural Counties, 
No. OOCS01331 (Sacramento County Superior Court) 
53 For example, the Farm Bureau claimed that the Final EISIEIR did not ade-
quately address the impacts of the Program on agricultural resources, and the Re-
gional Council of Rural Counties argued that the EISIEIR should have evaluated al-
ternatives that reduced exports from the Delta. 
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A major challenge for the Program will be to address the 
underlying fears and concerns of these groups while moving 
forward in the implementation stage. A key to this approach 
will be to develop regional strategies, in which local interests, 
rather than the state and federal agencies, develop and imple-
ment projects within the context of the overall plan. The 
agencies will then be in a position to offer technical, scientific, 
and financial assistance to locally-based, collaborative 
projects. 
VIII. LOOKING AHEAD 
The Davis Administration has significant political and fi-
nancial resources invested in the CALFED Program, and the 
final plan is likely to chart the course for water policy in the 
state for the next decade. The Program's success will largely 
be determined by the following factors: 
1. The Weather 
The state has been blessed with six years of normal or 
better rainfall, which has tended to minimize the impact of 
the conflicts among competing uses.54 But if the weather turns 
dry for an extended period before significant additional flexi-
bility is built into the system, conflicts will escalate, and 
stakeholder support for a collaborative process may evaporate 
in the face of water shortages. 
2. Meeting the Deadlines and Commitments 
Given the historic mistrust among the agencies and 
stakeholders, much of the credibility of the program depends 
upon the CALFED Program's ability to meet the aggressive 
milestones and cbmmitments in the Record of Decision. The 
agencies managed to meet all of the end-of-year commitments 
for the year 2000,55 but the uncertainty of federal funding for 
implementation threatens progress in the years ahead. 
To the agricultural and urban interests, the key issue will 
be whether the Program can deliver on its commitment to 
54 Water Conditions in California, California Cooperative Snow Surveys, Bulletin, 
120-1-01, CA Dept. of Water Resources, February 1, 2001, p. 16. 
55 See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, ANNuAL REPORT 2000, (2000). 
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provide significant improvements in water supply reliability. 
To gain environmental community support, the challenge will 
be to develop a world class ecosystem restoration program, 
and to fully apportion the costs and benefits of water storage 
projects to their intended beneficiaries. 
3. The Environmental Water Account 
The EWA is the centerpiece of the Program in the short-
term, and a major test of whether a non-regulatory approach 
can protect the estuary's fisheries while providing water sup-
ply reliability for exporters. If this approach is successful in 
the first year, the program is likely to gain significant mo-
mentum and may begin to restore stakeholder confidence in 
the CALFED agencies. 
4. Governance 
The institutional impediments to develop and implement 
a large-scale interagency program with multiple objectives are 
formidable. For example, agency budgets are nearly always 
based on narrow objectives or specific projects. While other 
large-scale programs are emerging in the Pacific Northwest, 
Everglades, Chesapeake Bay, etc., most are focused on a sin-
gle objective (i.e., ecosystem restoration) and are managed 
largely by one or a few agencies. 56 The Bay-Delta Program, by 
contrast, involves coordinating the activities of over a dozen 
agencies to implement its water supply, water quality, ecosys-
tem restoration, and levee stability projects and programs. 57 
It remains to be seen whether a consortium of agencies 
can effectively implement a large scale, multi-purpose pro-
gram. Without a high level of direct funding and accountabil-
ity from the legislature and congress, the task may be impos-
sible. The program and its staff are all borrowed from the 
participating agencies, and decision-making depends upon a 
consensus of these agencies. A new governance structure is 
56 For an overview of these issues, see the REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY Ecosys. 
TEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (1995). 
57 See Record of Decision, supra note 2 at p. 1. 
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essential to provide leadership, accountability and meaningful 
stakeholder involvement in implementing the program. 
5. Changing political leadership 
To date, the program has survived two governors and sev-
eral changes in leadership within the Clinton Administration. 
This pattern is likely to continue under the Bush Administra-
tion. The new administration is unlikely to abandon a bal-
anced plan and face the conflicts that would arise if it does 
not succeed. 
Maintaining continued support from the legislature and 
congress, however, will be more difficult. Individual members, 
who often have the power to block appropriations bills, may 
have no stake in a successful program. In addition, elected of-
ficials are more likely to be more supportive of specific pro-
grams or projects in their areas than the program as a whole. 
Securing balanced and adequate funding without compromis-
ing the plan is likely to be the Program's greatest challenge. 
6. Broad-based support and involvement in program 
implementation 
From the beginning, the program has been dedicated to a 
high level of stakeholder involvement in decision-making. 
This approach will be even more important as the program 
enters the implementation phase'. To attract continued sup-
port from state and federal elected officials, the program must 
be led by and be responsive to local and regional needs and 
concerns. 
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